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Article 1

Skeen: The Genetically Defective Offender

THE GENETICALLY DEFECTIVE OFFENDER
DAVID SKEENt

The criminaldefendant who suffersfrom an XYY,XXY, or XXYYchromosome abnormality seldom has been successful in asserting the defenses of
insanity or diminishedresponsibility. Mr. Skeen convincingly argues that
the lack of success is attributableto past inadequate medical knowledge,
inadequate trialpreparation,or using the evidence to prove the characteristic of aggression rather than retardation. Mr. Skeen provides a thorough
analysi's of the research on these genetic abnormalities, a history of the
insanio defense, a review of the cases involving geneticall defective offenders, and an analysis of the tacticalstrengths and weaknesses of using
evidence of genetic abnormality. As a result, this Article is a practical
primerfor the successful use of genetic abnormality evidence to gain acquittal or a reduced sentencefor the afticated defendant.
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Ever since our ancestral common law emerged out of the darkness of its early barbaric days, it has been a postulate of Western
civilization that the taking of life by the hand of an insane person
is not murder. But the nature and operation of the mind are so
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lating standards of criminal responsibility and the means for determining whether those standards are satisfied in a particular case
have greatly troubled law and medicine for more than a century.
Frankfurter, Felix, in United States ex rel Smith v. Baldt, 344 U.S.
561, 570 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no legal proceeding in our society which generates more
excitement and interest than the insanity trial. Unfortunately, the
stimulation provided is rarely accompanied by any real humanistic accomplishment.
The legal rules which guide the psychiatrist and the court in
assessing the criminal responsibility of the defendant were created
to find means of relating the complex field of mental illness to the
philosophical concept of legal responsibility. There is a legal presumption that in each case mental illness is definable; however,
psychiatrists themselves differ regarding the causes of mental illness and often have great difficulty in relating medical opinions to
legal definitions.
Insanity tests have been developed over a span of centuries
through the evolution of English and American law. These tests
were formulated to distinguish between the sane criminal seeking
to avoid criminal responsibility for his unlawful actions, and the
mentally incompetent defendant whose understanding of right
and wrong was so impaired that he should not be held legally responsible for his conduct.
This Article will examine a specific area of interface between
mental illness and criminality: the potential use of genetics in the
insanity defense. Specifically, I address whether a criminal defendant, who is involuntarily rendered retarded or mentally deficient from the effects of a genetic abnormality, can effectively
assert a defense based on traditional insanity tests or alternatively
use a defense of diminished capacity.
II.

GENETICS

One of the most intriguing aspects involving the study of genetic
abnormalities has been their alleged connection with criminal behavior.' Since 1961, the development of knowledge gained from
1. For a general discussion of genetics relative to the issues discussed in this paper,
see G. VALENTINE, THE CHROMOSOME DISORDERS: AN INTRODUCTION FOR CLINICIANS
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research on the genetically abnormal XYY male has passed
through two distinct phases and is now in its third phase. 2 The
discovery of a XYY case in 1961 initiated the first phase. This
phase was characterized by the discovery of other cases where the
XYY condition was ascertained from the examination of males
with some physical abnormality, often in conjunction with a de3
gree of mental retardation.
The second phase began in 1965 with a classic study in a special
security institution. 4 This study identified a high percentage of
XYY males among the institution population as compared to the
percentage of such males in the general population.5 This was the
first indication of a possible explanation for the criminal behavior
of these individuals, for if their numbers in the security institution
3-7, 34-39 (3rd ed. 1975); Montague, Chromosomes and Crime, Psychology Today, Oct. 1968,
at 42, 46-47; and generally W. KEETON, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE (3rd ed. 1980) for a discussion of genetic definitions.
The basic structure of the human body is the cell. Contained within each cell are
chromosomes. Each chromosome is a long strand of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and
contains the genetic blueprint of the entire body. In each human cell there are 46 chromosomes divided into 23 pairs. Of these pairs, 22 are identical and are concerned with bodily
functions common in both males and females. These are called autosomal chromosomes
or autosomes. The remaining pair of chromosomes, the sex chromosomes, are different in
male and female. The normal male has an XY sex chromosome constitution, while a
normal female has an XX chromosome constitution.
For the conception of a new human with 46 chromosomes, the number of chromosomes in the sperm and ovum must be halved. This reduction or division is meiosis. Unfortunately, not all individuals possess a normal sex chromosome constitution and some
may possess extra Y or X chromosomes. Although this phenomenon is not completely
understood, we know that during meiosis the sex chromosomes occasionally fail to divide
properly and a condition called nondisjunction results.
There are two divisions during meiosis. If nondisjunction occurs during the first division, this leads to two kinds of sperm cells: those with both X and Y chromosomes (XY)
and those with no sex chromosomes (00). If an XY sperm fertilizes a normal (X) female
ovum, an XXY individual will result. If nondisjunction occurs during the second division,
three types of sperm are produced: XX, YY and those containing no sex chromosomes.
Offspring resulting from fertilization with a normal female ovum will be, respectively:
XXX, XYY and XO.
An XYY individual could also be produced if the sex chromosomes fail to separate
normally in the early stages of cell division (mitosis) of a normal, fertilized XY ovum.
Individuals with such a failure may also be more likely to have a condition called mosaicism, which refers to the existence of a different number of sex chromosomes in different
tissues or parts of the body.
2. Brown, Males With an XYY Sex Chromosome Complement, 5 J. MED. GENETICS 341
(1968).
3. Id
4. Jacobs, Brunton, Melville, Brittain & McClemont, Aggressive Behavior, Mental Subnormah andtheA'YYMale, 208 NATURE 1351 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs, Aggressive
Behavior].
5. Id
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were greater than the percentage of such individuals in the general
population, it seemed plausible to assume the extra Y chromosome
might be responsible.
Although the characteristics of this abnormality were identified,
the study could not positively link the increased frequency of the
XYY males in the security institution to aggressive behavior,
mental deficiency, or a combination of these factors. 6 Another
study that examined tall men at three English security hospitals
confirmed the results of the first study. There were unusually high7
numbers of XYY males in English maximum security hospitals.
A third study produced evidence which strongly supported the
theory that the behavioral disturbances of XYY males were primarily determined by their genetic abnormality. 8
By 1967, the early studies had provided sufficient information
about the XYY male to allow more sophisticated studies to be pursued. In the present third phase, the XYY male and other forms
of genetic abnormality (XXY and XXYY males) are being studied
in great depth. 9
Although this paper is concentrating on the area of mental retardation resulting from a genetic abnormality, it is appropriate to
briefly discuss the previously mentioned connection between aggression and genetic abnormality. It has been hypothesized that a
positive link exists between antisocial behavior, aggression, and a
genetic abnormality in certain males. A review of the literature
does not reveal a sufficiently complete basis for agreeing or disagreeing with this hypothesis. Studies differ with respect to
whether genetically abnormal males are more or less violent or antisocial than genetically normal males.
A follow-up study of the 1961 English security institution report
6. Id at 1351-52. The research team reviewed previous studies which led to the
inquiry of whether an extra Y chromosome predisposes its carriers to unusually aggressive
behavior. The study reported findings in a survey of mentally subnormal male patients
with dangerous, violent, or criminal propensities. Tests were conducted on 197 subjects.
Twelve had a chromosome abnormality; seven had 47 chromosomes and an XYY sex
chromosome constitution, one had 48 chromosomes and an XXYY chromosome constitution, and one was an XY/XXY mosaic. The remaining three had structural abnormalities. The most important findings were that eight subjects had an extra Y chromosome,
representing 3-5% of the subject population. This represented a marked increase in frequency by comparison with the frequency of XYY males at birth in the general population. The study noted the XYY males were unusually tall, with a mean height of 73
inches.
7. Brown, supra note 2, at 341-42.
8. Id at 342.
9. Id
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attempted to clarify the early findings. The second study found
that although most XYY males had previously been aggressive
and violent, the crimes committed by the XYY individuals were
not different from those of other patients at the institution. °
Another study at the same institution one year later determined
that the XYY male committed fewer violent crimes; their disturbed behavior showed itself at an earlier age than genetically
normal XY males; and the incidence of crime among siblings in
the families of the XYY males was significantly less than in those
of the genetically normal XY control group."
In 1976, a review by the president of the American Society of
Human Genetics of previous research studies concluded that "data
are now available which indicate psychological differences between young noninstitutionalized adult XYY males when compared to XY controls. These differences indicated that XYY
males were less able to control the normal male aggressive drive in
frustrating or provocative situations and were more impulsive and
12
immature than XY controls."'
A study on the relationship between genetic abnormality in
males and aggression also published in 1976, however, concluded
10. Price, Strong, Whatmore & McClemont, Criminal Patients with AYYSex-Chromosome
Complement, 1 LANCET 565 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Price, et al., CriminalPatients]. The
study reported the clinical findings of the seven inmates identified with the XYY chromosome constitution in Jacobs, Aggressive Behavior, supra note 4, and for two other inmates
subsequently identified at the same institution. Of the nine XYY males, eight were classified as high grade mental defectives or below average in intelligence, and one had schizophrenia. All had criminal records. None had abnormal physical features, but six of the
nine were over six feet in height.
11. Price & Whatmore, Behaviour Disorders and Pattern of Crime Among, XYY Males Identifled at a Maximum Security Hospital, I BRIT. MED. J. 533 (1967) (A brief summary of the
study was published as Price & Whatmore, Criminal Behavior and the XYY Male, 213 NATURE 815 (1967)) [hereinafter cited as Price & Whatmore]. The study reports three of the
nine XYY males had been convicted before 10 years of age, whereas none of the control
group had any convictions before that age. The mean age of conviction for XYY males
was 13.1 years, and the mean age of the control group was 18 years. Of the nine XYY
males, only four had committed crimes against the person, whereas 17 out of 18 of the
control group had committed such crimes. Only 1 of the 31 siblings had a criminal record
for the XYY males, but 7 of 18 had criminal records for the control group. No other
members of the XYY male families had a history of mental illness. Id at 534-36.
All nine of the XYY males suffered from a severe degree of personality disorder, although there was no evidence of brain damage, epilepsy, or psychosis. Seven of the nine
were mentally subnormal with IQ's ranging between 60 and 80, and six of the nine had
been committed by courts to institutions for the mentally subnormal. Id at 534-35. See
also Money, Gaskin & Hull, Impulse, Aggression and Sexuality in the XYY Syndrome, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 220, 229 (1969) (discussing mental deficiency).
12. Hamerton, Human Population Cytogenetics: Dilemmas and Problems, 28 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 107, 117 (1976).
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that XYY males are not more likely to commit crimes of violence
than genetically normal XY males. 13 In addition, an analysis of
the criminal penalties imposed on XYY males indicated they were
not comparatively severe. 14 The same conclusions may also be
5
stated for the XXY male.'
To further evidence the disagreement in this area, in a recent
follow-up study of Danish patients with an XXY chromosome
constitution, it was discovered that at age twenty-six the XXY
males had violated the penal code at a rate of 26% of their sample
group and 38% had engaged in criminal behavior. In the XY control group, only 6% of the sample group had violated the penal
code or engaged in criminal behavior. 16 Ten years later, of the
same XXY males 29% had violated the penal code and 41% had
exhibited criminal behavior, whereas of the XY male control
group 6% had violated the penal code and 13% had exhibited
criminal behavior. 7 Notably, a recent study of XXYY males also
indicates that aggressive behavior is a post-pubertal feature of all
such afflicted males.'

8

Thus, research in the area of antisocial behavior and aggression
of the genetically abnormal male represents a confusing picture.
There is evidence that genetically abnormal males commit antisocial acts and can be aggressive, but the research is unclear whether
there is an increased frequency of such behavior when compared
with genetically normal males.19 Apparently, aggression currently
cannot be proven as a symptom of genetic abnormality and
thereby provide the basis for an insanity or diminished capacity
defense.
13. Witkin, Mednick, Schulsinger, Bakkestr6m, Christiansen, Goodenough,
Hirschhorn, Lundsteen, Owen, Philip, Rubin & Stocking, Crimnality n XYY and XXY
Men, 193 ScI. 547, 550 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Criminality in XYY and XXYMen].
14. Id
15. Id
16. Nielsen, Johnsen & S6rensen, Follow-up /0 years Later of 35 Klinefelter Males with
Karyotype 47,XXY and 16 Hypogonadal Males with Kayotype 16XY, 10 PSYCHOLOGICAL
MED. 345, 349 (1980).
i7. Id
18. Garry, Two Cases of 48,XXYY" With Discussion on the Behaviour of Prepubertaland
Postpubertal Patients, 92 N.Z. MED. J. 49, 50 (1980).
19. For further background on this area, see Brown, Price & Jacobs, FurtherInformation
on the Identity of 47,XYY Males, BRIT. MED. J. 325 (1968); Casey, Blank, Street, Segall,
McDougall, McGrath & Skinner, XY Chromosomes and Antisocial Behaviour, 2 LANCET 859
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Casey, et al., Antisocial Behaviour,-] Clark, Telfer, Baker & Rosen, Sex Chromosomes, Crime, and Psychosis, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1659 (1970); and Wiener,
Sutherland, Bartholomew & Hudson, XYY Males i a Melbourne Priton, I LANCET 150
(1968).
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Another identifiable trait of genetic abnormalities caused by extra Y or X chromosomes is tallness. Although both XYY and
XXY males tend to be taller than normal XY males, this is not a
factor in the increased prevalence of XYY males in security settings.2 0 Research indicates that the XYY male does not stay
longer in security settings than a genetically normal XY male, and
that white males in security settings are about three times more
2
likely to have such a genetic abnormality than black males. 1
The principal condition of agenetic abnormality to be discussed in
this paper, however, is mental retardation or mentally subnormal intell'gence. Through the three phases of research previously discussed,
these conditions have been the most frequently observed results of
a genetic abnormality.
Prior to a discussion of research studies in this area, it is necessary to present some background information on retardation. Retardation, regardless of the origin, is defined by the American
Psychiatric Association as "(1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, (2) resulting in, or associated with, deficits
or impairments in adaptive behavior, (3) with the onset before the
age of 18. ' '22 Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is
defined as an IQ of 70 or below on an individually administered
IQ test.2 3 Adaptive behavior refers to the effectiveness with which
an individual meets the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected of his or her age and cultural
group. 24 The subtypes of mental retardation are classified as mild
(IQ level of 50-70); moderate (IQ level of 35-49); severe (IQ level
of 20-34); and profound (IQ level below 20).25
When the clinical picture of retardation develops for the first
time after the age of 18, the syndrome is then called "dementia"
rather than mental retardation. 26 Dementia is classified as an or20. Hamerton, supra note 12, at 115. See also Philip, Lundstein, Owen & Hirschhorn,
The Frequency of Chromosome Aberrations ih Tall Men with Special Reference to 47,XYY and
47,XXY 28 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 404, 410 (1976) (conducted study of 4,591 Danish
men born during 1944-47, concluding that XYY and XXY men are taller than genetically
normal XY males).
21. Hamerton, supra note 12, at 114-115.
22. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 36 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. For an overview of the retarded individual in the criminal justice system, see THE RETARDED OFFENDER (M. Santamour & P. Watson eds. 1982).
23. DSM-III, supra note 22, at 36.
24. Id at 37.
25. Id at 39.
26. Id at 107.
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ganic mental disorder, whose essential feature is loss of intellectual
abilities of sufficient severity to interfere with social or occupational functioning. The deficit is multifaceted and involves memory, judgment, abstract thought, and a variety of other higher
cortical (cerebral) functions.

27

Important to the discussion to follow, is that several of the genetically abnormal males identified in research studies had IQ
levels within the retardation classification standard. This fact
again supports the argument for association of mental retardation
and genetic abnormalities for some criminals.
In the previously discussed 1965 English security institution
study, although the patients were mentally subnormal XYY males
with dangerous, violent, or criminal propensities, no definite conclusions could be drawn regarding the cause of their criminality.28
A follow-up study that included two more XYY patients subsequently discovered in the institution population, produced additional information. Eight of the patients studied were classified as
high-grade mental defectives, or as below average in intelligence,
with the ninth patient being of average intelligence but having a
mental illness. 29 While institutionalized, these patients had come
under observation because of a combination of their criminal behavior and diminished responsibility due to mental subnormality
30
or mental illness.
A third study of these individuals in 1967 produced a more detailed assessment of the behavioral characteristics. All XYY patients were suffering from a severe degree of personality disorder,
but no known conditions accounted for such problems. 3' Seven of

the nine XYY males were mentally subnormal with IQ's ranging
between 60 and 80.32 Six of the nine XYY patients had been committed by courts to institutions for the mentally subnormal, compared with only three of the eighteen genetically normal XY
control patients. 33 Most social classes were represented by the
families of the XYY patients, none of the parents had a criminal
27. Id.
28. Jacobs, Aggressive Behavior, supra note 4, at 1351. See also Casey, et al., Antisocial
Behaviour, supra note 19; MacLean, Mitchell, Harnden, Williams, Jacobs, Buckton, Baikie,
Brown, McBride, Strong, Close & Jones, A Survey of Sex-Chromosome Abnorma/ities Among
4,54 Mental Defectives, I LANCET 293 (1962).
29. Price, et al., Criminal Patients, supra note 10, at 565.
30. Id. at 566.
31. Price & Whatmore, supra note 11, at 534.
32. Id
33. Id. at 535.
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record or a history of mental illness, and no other members of the
immediate families were known to have a history of mental illness. 34 The study concluded:
It is clear that each one of the XYY patients had suffered from
a severe disturbance of his whole personality and also that in
none was intellectual function, at any level, sufficiently adequate to suppress the disordered drives leading to criminal behavior. . . . All the data we have obtained from the
examination of XYY males at the State Hospital at Carstairs
lead us to believe that the extra Y chromosome has resulted in a
this disorder has led
severely disordered personality, and 3that
5
these men into conflict with the law.
This introductory work in the area of intelligence measurement on
genetically abnormal males formed the second phase of research in
the areas of mental retardation and subnormal intelligence for the
genetically abnormal offender.
In the third phase of research on genetic abnormalities, there
have been several important works in the area of subnormal intelligence resulting from genetic abnormalities. A 1973 study suggests that the behavioral manifestation of the XYY abnormality
tends to interfere with the acquisition of a measurably normal intelligence, or alternatively, the same events that resulted in deviant
behavior in XYY males also influenced their intelligence. 36 This
theory is supported by the finding that XYY white males are eighteen times more likely to be found in mental-penal settings than
37
genetically normal XY white males.
The same study also suggests that physiological (organic) factors
may be operative in XYY males, but only for those who already
have a predisposition to deviant behavior. 38 There is no evidence
contradictory to this theory; other hypotheses fail to explain the
association XYY males have with deviance. XYY males do not
appear, however, to be among the most dangerous, violent, and
physically aggressive inmates, and their offenses are equally or less
39
serious than normal XY males.

Many of the research findings for XYY males are also valid for
XXY males, a genetic abnormality also known as Klinefelter's syn34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id at
Id
Hook,
Id at
Id at
Id at

536.
Behavioral Implications ofthe Human XYY Genotype, 179 SCi. 139, 145 (1973).
146.
145.
146.
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drome. Height is increased for XXY males but not to the extent of
XYY males. 40 The newborn rate is 1 in 900 for XXY white males,
compared with 1 in 1,000 for XYY white males. 4' The XXY male
is also likely to be found in greater numbers in settings for highgrade retards than either XYY males or genetically normal XY
males, but are not as likely as XYY males to be in mental-penal
42
settings.
The XXYY males also have the characteristics of Klinefelter's
syndrome. They are taller than the average XYY male, have a
newborn rate of about 1 in 25,000, and their retardation rate in
security settings appears to be afifoy-fold increase over normal XY
males. 43 There is also evidence of increased mental retardation
and deviant behavior in XXYY males in comparison to XYY
males, which provides additional evidence for the significance of
44
extra Y or X chromosomes.
A 1976 study compared the criminal rates of XYY and XXY
males with genetically normal XY males, each having equivalent
levels of intellectual functioning. 45 The study concluded that the
XYY males had an appreciably lower mean score on a standard
army selection intelligence test than did the XY males, and the
XYY males had a substantially lower mean on the related index of
educational level attained. 46 The XXY males had results similar
47
to the XYY males on their test scores.
Also in 1976, a report concluded that the XYY chromosome abnormality was a genuine medical issue and not merely a myth.
The author reported research studies stating the incidence of XYY
males in newborn populations to be approximately 1 per 1,000
male births and the prevalence among older, randomly-selected
males to be similar.48 But most importantly, the report indicates
there is a 4 to 20-fold increase in the frequency of XYY males in
40. Id.
41. Id The author believes the newborn rate of XXY individuals among whites in
North America and Europe is unlikely to be greater than I in 250 and probably is about I
in 900. See also Hamerton, supra note 12, at 113 (suggesting the newborn rate for XYY

individuals is I in 1,000).
42. Hook, supra note 36, at 146-47.
43. Id at 147.
44. Id
For some additional information on the XXYY genetic abnormality, see
Garry,supra note 18.
45. Crminality tn XYY and XXY Men, supra note 13, at 551.
46. ld. at 553.
47. Id at 554.
48. Hamerton, supra note 12, at 112-113. In comparison, the incidence of an extra X
chromosome in women is also 1.0 per 1,000, and such women are more likely to have
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security settings compared to the general newborn population and
unselected older male populations. 49 To a lesser degree, the same
disproportion applies to XXY males, who show a 2 to 10-fold increase in security settings while the XXYY males show a 40 to 100fold increase in mental and mental-penal settings. 50 There is also
evidence of behavior problems and learning disabilities among
51
XYY children.
These studies reflect the consensus among research scientists on
the relationship of genetic abnormalities and resulting conditions
such as mental retardation and mental subnormality, and suggest
an alarming picture of the effects on white males. 52 The significant increase of XYY, XXY, and XXYY males in security and
mental-penal institutions is evidence that certain genetic abnormalities may result in the afflicted individual's having a significantly greater chance to be involved in criminal behavior. It also
seems evident that researchers have established a presumptive relationship between extra Y and X chromosomes and mental retardation or subnormal intelligence in white males. With the
disproportionate numbers of XYY, XXY, and XXYY males in security and mental-penal institutions, the question necessarily focuses on whether these individuals are legally responsible for their
criminal acts, or whether they satisfy some test of insanity or diminished capacity which would excuse all or part of their criminal
conduct.
mental diseases than genetically normal XX females. See Bartholomew, Psychopathy, Sex
Chromosome Abnormalities, and the Law, 4 ADEL. L. REv. 273, 277-78 (1972).
49. Hamerton, supra note 12, at 114.
50. Id
51. Id at 117. The author believes that some XYY males do show psychological
differences when compared to genetically normal XY males, and such differences may be
recognizable by detailed psychological testing.
For a discussion of the ethical considerations in chromosome screening of parents and
newborn infants to detect potential genetic disorders, see Hamerton, Ethical Considerations
in Newborn Chromosome Screening Programs, in XV BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES, No. 1, at 267-69 (1979). Another recent study has called for a serious interdisciplinary program of research into early detection and prevention of chronic criminal
behavior. See San Diego Union, Jan. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 2, which reports a study predicting
that biological and sociological testing will one day be able to predict the likelihood of
whether a child will commit a crime years later.
52. For additional background information, see Close, Goonetilleke, Jacobs & Price,
The Incidence of Sex Chromosomal Abnormalities in Mentally Subnormal Males, 7 CYTOGENETICS
277 (1968), confirming the essential features of the XYY male; and Telfer, Baker, Clark &
Richardson, Incidence of Gross Chromosomal Errors Among Tall Criminal American Males, 159
Scl. 1249 (1968).
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REVIEW OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE

A.

English Law

History records that civilized man has acknowledged the exist53
ence of insanity as far back in history as the seventh century.
Beginning in the fourteenth century, insanity became a recognized
ground for the granting of a royal pardon, but only after the accused was tried and convicted of a crime. 5 4 Not until the sixteenth
century was insanity established as a valid defense to a conviction
55
for a criminal act.
In 1724, in Rex v. Arnold 56 the charge to the jury by Justice
Tracy established a new standard for common law insanity referred to as the "wilde beast" test.5 7 In the nineteenth century,
Hawkins formulated a test for legal responsibility, marking the beginning of the good and evil concept. 58 Sir Matthew Hale divided
53. Crotty, The History of lnsan'ty as a Defense to Crime in English Criminal Law, 12 CALIF.
L. REv. 105, 110 (1924) (citing 2 B. THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS 65 (1840)).

54. Note, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 1005 n.125 (1932) (citing I. Rot. Par.
443b, 3 Edw. 11 (1310), where "the king promises that he will pardon felony only in cases
where pardon was anciently granted, 'if a man kill another through misadventure or in
self-defense or in madness.' "); see also Gray, The Insanity Defense.- HistoriialDevelopment and
Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 562 n.13 (1972). See generally I M.
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29-36 (1689) (1st Am. ed. 1847), for Sir Matthew Hale's

treatment of "dementia" as a defense to criminal responsibility.
55. Gray, supra note 54, at 562; see also Note, supra note 54, at 1005 n.128 (citing Y.B.
Mich. 21 Hen. VII, pl. 16 (1505)). "A man was arraigned for the murder of an infant.
And it was found that at the time of the murder the felon was of unsound memory (de non
satme memoire)." See also A. FITZHERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM (9th ed. London

1974), describing the insane man as "[h]e who is of unsound memory, hath not any manner of discretion; for if he kill a man it shall not be felony, or murder . . . because it
appeareth that he hath not discretion; for if he had discretion he should be hanged for the
same." Id. at 202.
56. 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724),discussedzi Crottysupra note 53, at 114; seealso Gray,
supra note 54, at 562 n.15; Note, supra note 54, at 1006 n.133.
57. Crotty, supra note 53, at 114.
"[lit is not every kind of frantic humour or something unaccountable in a man's
actions, that points him out to be such a madman as is to be exempted from
punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and
memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a
brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never object of punishment."
Id (quoting Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724)).
58.

I W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1-3 (8th ed. John Curwood ed. 1824). His

test provided:
Sect. 1. As to the First Point, it is to be observed, that those who are under a
natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil, as (2) infants under
the age of discretion, ideots and lunatics (3), are not punishable by any criminal
prosecution whatsoever.
(2) Infancy, as is above understood, is a defect of the will or understanding.
Infants under the age of discretion ought not to be punished by any criminal
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mental incapacity into three groups for his test of legal responsibil59
ity or lack of it.

The classic English opinion in M'Naghten's Case60 is important
not only for its test of insanity, but equally for the allowance of
testimony by expert medical witnesses. M'Naghten was charged
in 1843 with killing Edward Drummond, secretary to Sir Robert
Peel, and the prominence of the parties created a good deal of
public interest in the case. At the conclusion of the trial, Lord
Chief Justice Tindal tendered a jury instruction which is essentially the right and wrong test, 6' and which was to furnish much of
the basis for later criticism of the case.
After the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, the House of
Lords was asked to clarify the decision. This led to the famous test
of insanity set forth by Lord Tindal. 62 This new test of insanity
substantially changed the common law notion of insanity by placing the emphasis on a disease of the mind, an illness resulting from
prosecution. What the age of discretion is, is matter of variety in different
nations.
(3) Ideots, lunatics during their lunacy, and madmen are all incapable of committing crime, as falling within the accident defect of the will included by
Lord Hale under the term dementia, or insanity.
Sect. 3. And it seems agreed at this day, that if one who has committed a capital
offence become noncompos before conviction, he shall not be arraigned; and if
after conviction, that he shall not be executed.
Id.
59. I M. HALE, supra note 55, at 29-36. The first category was idiocy, which included
natural defects such as mental retardation. The second category was dementia accidentahs vel
adventila, which was insanity resulting from an injury to the brain, a disease, or a concussion. Hale further divided this second category into two classes: partial and total insanity.
The third categry was dementia a.ctata, commonly known as drunkenness. See Crotty,
supra note 53, at 115-116 (discussion of cases which used the partial insanity concept of
criminal liability); see also Gray, supra note 54, at 564 (cases on "insane delusions" as a
defense to criminal responsibility). See generally H. WEIHOFFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954) (discusses evolution of insanity as a defense to criminal
responsibility).
60. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
61. See id. "The question to be determined is, whether, at the time the act in question
was committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of his understanding,'so as to know
that he was doing a wrong or wicked act." Id at 719-20. See generally Note, supra note 54,
at 1006.
62. Lord Tindal's test was:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,*that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). See generally Crotty,supra note 53, at 11719.
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a biological disorder of the brain. In the past, insanity tests had
seemed preoccupied with behavioral or nonbiological conditions of
the defendant, and this shift of emphasis was undoubtedly a result
of the courts' changing attitude about the use of expert medical
testimony at trial.
In the first systematic attempt to categorize criminal defenses,
Hale made it clear that mental incapacity was to be a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. Having preceded M'Naghten by
many years, his writings indicated a bias against medical testimony and urged that it be given no greater weight than lay testimony. 63 Not until M'ANaghten was the testimony of medical
doctors, as experts in the field of mental disease and deficiency,
accorded special status. For the first time physicians could offer an
opinion concerning an event which they had not actually witnessed, but which they might reconstruct using newly developed
medical techniques. Although physicians still could not determine
the fact of insanity, they were permitted to testify whether the accused had been suffering from a disabling disease at the time of the
alleged offense and to state whether the criminal act was a product
64
of the disease.
B. American Law
The rule pronounced in M'Naghten became the foundation of
American law on insanity, although some jurisdictions supplemented it with the irresistible impulse test. 65 In the twentieth century, as our knowledge of science and medicine advanced, so did
our understanding of psychological and psychiatric disorders.
These advances resulted in a vigorous debate on the continued
usefulness of the M'Naghten test in a modern era, due to the test's
66
limitations.
Several arguments have been advanced in support of retaining
M'Naghten as a test of legal irresponsibility. One theory argues
63. See Gray, supra note 54, at 565-66.
64. Id. at 566.
65. See H. WEIHOFFEN, sUpra note 59, at 68-8 1; see also Platt & Diamond, The Origins
of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibilty and Its Subsequent Development in the
Uni'tedStates. An HistoricalSurvey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227 (1966); Note, The Guilty but Mentally ll Alternative, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223 (1982). But see S. GLUECK, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 254-55 (1925) (discussing State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369
(1871)).
66. S. GLUECK, supra note 65, at 161-86; C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 100 (14th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON'S]; H. WEIHOFFEN, supra note 59, at
63-67.
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that the goal of general deterrence in the criminal law is best
served by declaring irresponsible only those persons who clearly
could not have been deterred from their criminal acts because they
could not have employed sufficient reason to restrain their conduct. 6 7 Fundamental to this view is the proposition that the threat
of punishment must be maintained as long as any opportunity exists to prevent criminal activity. If the offender is not deterrable
because of a disease of the mind and, therefore, is unable to distinguish between right and wrong, then no harm exists to society to
exempt such persons from criminal responsibility for their criminal
acts. 68
Other theories suggest deterrability is not the foundation of responsibility, but rather that responsibility rests on moral blameworthiness as determined by society as a whole rather than by the
individual offender. 69 Society identifies those individuals who are
without moral blame for their criminal conduct, independent from
a consideration of the offender's ability to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the iaw. 70
It has been argued that M'Naghten asks the questions which psychiatrists and psychologists cannot answer. Experts are not being
asked whether an offender acted according to generally accepted
standards of morality, but rather whether the offender had sufficient intellect at the time of the commission of the criminal conduct to know what the generally accepted standards were.7 1 In
essence, was the offender able to make moral and ethical judgments at the time of the commission of the criminal act? A related
criticism, that MNaghten restricts expert testimony from reaching
72
the jury on these issues, has been disproven by one study.
For all the apparent dissatisfaction with MNaghlen, there are
equally valid reasons for retaining it as one of the standards of
legal irresponsibility. Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction with the
M'Naghten test has resulted in alternate standards being developed. M'Naghen has been replaced in a majority of jurisdictions
73
by the ALI-Model Penal Code test.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAN%281 (1972).
Id
Id. at 281-82.
Id at 282.
Id
Id.
See Favole, Mental Disablho in the Amertian Criminal Process. A Four Issue Survey, in
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The M'Naghlen test focuses on whether the accused was afflicted
with a disease of the mind so as not to know the nature and quality
of his act, or if he did know, that he did not know what he was
doing was wrong. Quer. Does this standard of insanity affect an
accused who has a genetic defect?
Some commentators have focused on the aggressive behavior allegedly associated with genetically defective offenders in analyzing
whether M'Naghlen would relieve criminal responsibility.7 4 Although there may be some evidence of aggression, it may be but
one symptom of the retardation. The underlying cause of the
criminal behavior seems to be associated more closely with
retardation.
Retardation is a "mental disease" that fits the M'Naghten test.
Similarly, depending on the level of retardation, an accused who
has a genetic defect may not have known the nature and quality of
his acts or that his actions were wrong. The most important factor
of the XYY chromosome defect is not whether a "criminal" gene
or chromosome "compels" the accused to commit criminal acts,
but whether the mental impairment caused by retardation is attributable to the extra "Y" chromosome.
It is essential to consider the effects of retardation associated
with a genetic defect in each case to determine whether an accused
can satisfy the requirements of the M'Naghten test. If an accused is
to prevail he must prove the retardation is severe enough to preclude his knowing the nature and quality of his act, or that he did
not know his actions were wrong. An accused with severe or
profound mental retardation should qualify for this defense, and a
moderately retarded accused may qualify depending on his individual adaptive behavior.
The irresistible impulse or control test focuses on whether the
accused could have prevented himself from committing the criminal act even though he knew the nature and quality of his act and
that the act was wrong.7 5 This test is sometimes a supplement to
(J. Jonahan & H. Steadman, eds. 1983); Note, supra note 65, at 233; see also WHARTON'S, supra note 66, at § 100. Minnesota follows the M'Naghten rule. See MINN. STAT.
247

§ 611.026 (1982).
74. Wallach & Rubin, The PremenstrualSyndromeand CrminalResponsibility, 19 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 210, 240 n.131 (1971); Comment, Law, Responsibility, and the XYY Syndrome, 7
Hous. L. REV. 355, 375-76 (1970); Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892,
905-07 (1970). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 334.
75. WHARTON'S, supra note 66, § 101, at 10-17. Irresistible impulse as it relates to
insanity was defined in Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897) to mean:
Such a perverted and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as to
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M'Naghen; it is not the sole test of insanity in any American jurisdiction.7 6 Unless the evidence indicates that at all times, including
the time of the criminal act, the genetically abnormal offender
found it impossible to control his behavior, it is unlikely that this
standard would provide a sufficient defense. The significance of
this test depends on which party has the burden of proof to establish insanity or sanity.
The initial burden of rebutting the presumption of sanity is on
the defendant. 77 The prevailing rule is that the evidence must
raise a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's mental responsibility for his criminal act. A few jurisdictions, however, appear
to require a lesser standard of proof, sometimes stated as "some
evidence" or a "scientilla of evidence.

7T

Once the defendant has met this burden, it must be determined
which party has the burden of persuasion. In about half of the
states and in the federal system, the prosecution must prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. In other jurisdictions, the defendant
must prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 79
The important factor affecting the genetically abnormal offender's ability to control his behavior is the possibility of retardation and its resulting symptoms. This would only become relevant
to the irresistible impulse defense if the retardation was sufficient
to prevent the accused from controlling his actions. Retardation
becomes important in this defense because of its causation. Genetically caused retardation is an involuntary condition, an important
factor of the irresistible impulse defense.8 0
More recent insanity tests have attempted to incorporate advances in scientific knowledge and theory. In Durham v. United
render a person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or unconscious at the time of the nature of the act he is committing, or where, though
conscious of it and able to distinguish between right and wrong and know that
the act is wrong, yet his will, by which I mean the governing power of his mind,
has been otherwise than voluntarily so completely destroyed that his actions are
not subject to it,
but are beyond his control.
Id at 378. This definition of insanity was affirmed in Matheson v. United States, 227 U.S.
540 (1913).
76. See Favole, supra note 73; Note, supra note 65, at 229-30; see also Note, Constitutional
Lbnitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56
B.U.L. REv. 499 (1976).
77. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,supra note 67, at 312.
78. Id at 313.
79. Id; see, e.g., State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 334-35, 246 N.W.2d 48, 51-52 (1976).
80. See Davis v. United States, 164 U.S. 373, 378 (1897) (defining irresistible impulse
as it relates to insanity).
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States,8" ' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals specifically rejected the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests and attempted
to interject medicine and psychology into the legal process by formulating a new definition of insanity.8 2 The new definition focused on the medical aspects of the offender's actions, providing
that no criminal responsibility existed if the accused was suffering
from a mental disease or defect and his criminal actions were the
product of the disease or defect.8 3 This test is not concerned with
moral or ethical standards, like M'Naghten, and contains no legal
standard of criminal responsibility.
The Durham test is of historical interest only because no jurisdiction currently uses it, including the District of Columbia.8 4 New
81. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Bazelon, J.).
[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or defect. We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use "defect" in the
sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or the result of an injury, or the
residual effect of a physical or mental disease.
Id at 874-75. The court in effect adopted the "product" test first announced in State v.
Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1869).
82. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In rejecting the
M'aghten test the court stated:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is inadequate in that
(a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic realities and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in
all circumstances. We find that the "irresistible impulse" test is also inadequate
in that it gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and
reflection and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the
inadequate right-wrong test.
Id. at 874. For a discussion of the intent and subsequent failure of Durham, see Bazelon,
The Perils of Wizardq, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317 (1974); Douglas, The Durham Rule.- A
Meeting Groundfor Lawyers and Psychiatnts, 41 IOWA L. REV. 485 (1956); and Insanity and the
Criminal Law--A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1955).
83. In McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the term mental
disease or defect was defined as "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." Id. at
851.
84. Favole, supra note 73. In United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) the court formally rejected Durham by holding a "principal reason" for its decision to depart from the Durham test was the undesirable and undue dominance over the
jury by expert witnesses. Id. at 981-83. Hale, expressing a similar concern, argued that
expert testimony should be given only the same weight as lay testimony. See Gray, supra
note 54. For a discussion of Brawner, see Symposium on United States v. Brawner, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 17. Interestingly, it appears the District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in which the insanity defense is widely used. See Note, The Right and Responsibility of a
Court to Impose the Insanity Defense over the Defendant's Objection, 65 MINN. L. REV. 927, 928
n.5 (1981).
The Third Circuit, in rejecting Durham, stated an important rationale for its demise:
[Durham] omits the most important step in deciding the issue of criminal respon-
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Hampshire still uses a version of the "product" rule, but has never
85
adopted the Durham rule.

The formulation of the ALI-Model Penal Code of insanity
marks the last stage of the American insanity test evolution. 86 This
standard requires that the accused have a mental disease or defect
and lack substantial (but not total or complete) capacity to appreciate the criminality, or in the alternative, wrongfulness, of his action or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. A
majority of American jurisdictions now use the ALI-Model Penal
Code test. 87
An accused suffering from a genetically caused abnormality
may be most fortunate to be tried in Model Code jurisdictions because the ALI test does not require total incapacity. If retardation
is present as the result of a genetic abnormality, the accused has
the possibility of proving that the retardation precluded him from
substantia'_y (but not totally or completely) conforming his conduct
to the law or from appreciating the criminality of his act.
C

Mens Rea

The evolution of the insanity defense reflects a growing recognition by society that some defendants, because of their mental or
physical conditions, do not possess the requisite mens rea to commit
a criminal act. Generally, some form of mens rea (guilty mind) is
necessary for an offense which is malum zn se, or wrong in itself,8 8
but where the criminal offense is malum prohibitum, wrong because
society so defines, mens rea is not a necessary element of the crime
sibility, namely that of determining the total mental condition of the defendant
at the time he committed the act, and providing the jury with a standard by
means of which an ultimate social and moral judgment can be rendered.
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3rd Cir. 1961).
85. Favole, supra note 73.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This test provides:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct.
87. Favole, supra note 73; Note, supra note 65, at 233.
88. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 785 (2nd ed. 1969). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines malum in se as "[a] wrong in itself, an act or case involving
illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral and
public law." Id at 865.
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unless expressly made so by statute. 89 The fact that an offense is
malum prohibi/um should not, however, prevent the accused from
invoking the insanity defense.
To comprehend the nature of the genetic insanity defense, it is
necessary to discuss the concept of criminal intent. One author
has suggested that the joint operation of the guilty act (actus reus)
and the guilty mind (mens rea) is a suitable definition of a crime. 90
Other authors have discovered a variety of confusing terms which
are indiscriminately used by courts to describe culpable mental
states, 91 or have defined mens rea in terms of what consequences the
defendant foresaw by his actions. 92 The ALI-Model Penal Code
has defined the minimum requirements of mens rea or criminal culpability in the terms of four distinct mental states: purposely,
93
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.
A defendant whose criminal intent is affected by a mental defect
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 88, defines malum prohbium as "[a] wrong
prohibited; a thing which is wrong because prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law; an
act involving an illegality resulting from positive law." Id. at 865 (emphasis in original).
90. Perkins,Rationale ofMens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1939). Perkins defines actual
intent, as distinguished from crtininal intent, as follows: "If one acts for the purpose of
causing a certain result, he intends that result whether it is likely to happen or not. As to
consequences not included in his purpose, he intends those, and only those, which he
realizes are substantially certain to be produced!" Id. at 911 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 13 comment a (1934)).
91. WHARTON'S, supra note 66, § 27, at 136, describes the use of terms such as intentionally, purposely, designedly, knowingly, maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, general intent,
specific intent, scienter, fraudulently, corruptly, recklessly, negligently, gross negligence,
culpable negligence, and criminal negligence.
92. Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917). The author states:
[Aln actor intends a particular consequence when either (1) he wishes or desires it
to happen as the result of the act which he does for the purpose of bringing
about the result in question; or (2) when at the time he does the act he adverts to
the consequences in question as one which will necessarily result from the act,
and this even if he would be glad to have this particular consequence not happen
if he could avoid it and still bring about the consequence which he has primarily
in view.
d at 657-58.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), defines these four
terms as follows:
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such
a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
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might not have any of the mental states set forth above. A criminal act committed under such circumstances may be characterized
as an involuntary compulsion (automatism), which occurs when
an individual can perform complex automatic or involuntary activity while in a state of impaired consciousness. 94 Similarly, if a
genetic defect was the direct cause of an offender's mental condition which resulted in some criminal act being performed, then the
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor's situation.
For general background, see Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DICK. L. REx'. 95
(1934). For excellent discussions of the English definition of knowledge, see 2 J. STEPHAN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 114-18 (1883); Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31 (1936). See generally Erlinder, Mfens
Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court" Toward a ConstitutionalDoctrine of Substantive Criminal
Law, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163 (1981).
94. For a discussion of the automatism defense, see Rex v. Charlson, 1 All E. R. 859
(1955); Ard, Automatism andlasamty, 4 SYDNEY, L. REx. 36 (1962); Beck, Voluntay Conduct
Automatism, Insanity and Drunkenness, 9 CRIM. L.Q. 315 (1967); Rose, CriminalResponsibitity
and Competency as InfAenced by Organic Disease, 35 Mo. L. REx'. 326, 342-45 (1970). The
thrust of the automatism defense is the consciousness of the defendant. Unconscious criminal actions normally excuse the defendant from criminal responsibility; therefore, consciousness is considered a sine qua non to criminal liability. See Fox, Physical Disorder
Consciousness and CriminalLiabihty, 63 COLUM. L. REx'. 645, 651-52 (1963). MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) takes a similar position:
Section 2.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act,"
Omission as Basis of Liabih'ty;
Possession as an Act.
(1)A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which
he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
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possibility exists that no true mens rea was formed by the offender
and, therefore, no culpability for the criminal act would arise.9 5 It
is more probable, however, that a genetic defect merely causes a
diminished degree of responsibility or knowledge for the criminal
act, manifested as severe retardation in the offender.
To assert that a genetic defect negates mens rea by its mere presence and "compels" an individual to commit criminal acts is simply not justifiable based on current scientific research. Sufficient
research has been completed, however, to conclude that retardation is a common symptom of the XYY, XXY, and XXYY criminal.9 6 Retardation itself would not absolve an accused from
criminal culpability based on lack of mens rea, unless the accused
was so retarded as to be unable to function. The level of retardation found in genetically defective criminals would subject each
accused to a trial where the extent and effect of the retardation
would be judged by the trier of fact.
D.

Diminzshed Capacity

Diminished capacity is closely related to and often difficult to
distinguish from mens rea. Mens rea is concerned with the "guilty
mind" or conscious knowledge of the accused, whereas diminished
capacity is concerned with whether there is "evidence of an abnormal mental condition tending to prove either that the accused
could not or did not entertain the specific intent or state of mind
'9 7
essential to the offense."
Traditionally, diminished capacity has been asserted as a defense to negate a required mental state, such as specific intent (premeditation) in a first degree murder charge, 98 and to determine
whether a defendant was entitled to a sentence of imprisonment
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.

95. One article has suggested a genetic disorder, such as premenstrual syndrome, can
result in complete intellectual derangement and in effect cause the criminal behavior during the menstrual cycle. See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 74, at 241. But see Horney,
Menstrual Cycles and Crnmbial Responsibility, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1978) (suggests the
premenstrual syndrome defense is premature until further research is completed).
96. See generally supra notes 1-52 accompanying text (discussion on genetics).
97. 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 41, at 160 (1981).
98. Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defense, 77 COLUM.
L. REv. 827, 828 (1977)
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rather than death. 99 Diminished capacity is not a substitute for
legal insanity, 00 but has been recognized in several jurisdictions as
a separate defense not amounting to legal insanity.10 It is essentially a defense of psychiatric and psychological evidence on the
sole issue of intent. The Model Penal Code provides that
"[e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or
defect shall be admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element
' 02
of the offense. t
The only valid measure of the genetically defective offender's
criminal culpability must reflect the effect of the defect on his
mental capacity to form the requisite intent to commit the criminal act. It follows that the concepts of mens rea and diminished
capacity are logical vehicles for accurately measuring the offender's criminal responsibility.
When the criminal justice system is confronted with an accused
suffering from a genetic defect, it should not judge his criminal
conduct against a legal standard that does not examine the cause
of the problem that subjected the accused to criminal sanctions. If
a genetically defective offender is so retarded that he was unable to
conform his conduct to the law, or was unable to rationally conclude that his conduct was unlawful, no criminal culpability
should arise. If we look to the cause of the criminal act (retardation, for example), we must conclude that the act occurred
through no fault of the accused.10 3 In the more traditional diminished capacity cases the accused often caused the diminished capacity by his own actions, such as the voluntary use of alcohol or
drugs. The distinction between the accused whose diminished
ability to control his behavior results from voluntary action, and
the accused who suffers from an involuntary genetic defect, is fundamental to fairly appropriating criminal culpability under the
0 4
concept of diminished capacity.1
99. See WHARTON'S, supra note 66, § 104, at 33.
100. See Arenella, supra note 98.
101. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968 & Supp. 1983).
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
103. See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584 (1926).
104. Fingarette, Dinizshed Mental Capacity as a Crmbinal Law Defence, 37 MOD.L. REv.
264, 264-65 (1974). Fingarette asserts that diminished capacity should be separated into
two distinct areas of culpability. One area occurs where the accused was culpable for the
origin of his condition, and the other occurs where the accused was irrational through no
fault of his own. The first offender should not escape responsibility or culpability for his
criminal conduct, and the specific degree of culpability would depend on the way in
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From the available information on the effects of genetic defects,
it seems irrational to determine criminal culpability using the
traditional "all or nothing" legal insanity tests. Use of the diminished capacity doctrine to assess criminal culpability according to
the degree of impairment better reflects the public policy of assigning blame to persons responsible for the criminal act. Judicial
recognition of this argument is hypothetical, since no genetically
defective offender has asserted this defense. It may be helpful,
however, to examine how courts have applied the diminished capacity defense.
In United States v. Brawner, 105 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia not only repudiated the Durham test by adopting
the ALl-Model Penal Code test, but also discussed the concept of
diminished capacity for specific intent crimes.' °6 The court
adopted a rule which "permits the introduction of expert testimony as to abnormal condition if it is relevant to negate, or establish, the specific mental condition that is an element of the
crime."1o7
An interesting aspect of this decision is the apparent judicial
sanction of expert testimony presented by the prosecution to prove
specific intent. In a criminal insanity trial, expert psychiatric and
psychological testimony presented by the prosecution is most often
used to rebut the defense claim of insanity. Here, the court says
such evidence may be introduced in the prosecution's case in chief
to prove an element of the offense charged, i.e., specific intent.
The burden of rebutting the inference of specific intent then falls
which the originating culpability was related to the impaired state of mind. The latter
offender would not be responsible for his conduct. In effect, the author advocates a complete defense, based on diminished capacity, for any mental condition (including retardation) not the fault of the accused. Id
105. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
106. Id. at 999.
107. Id. at 1002 n.75. The footnote sets forth the procedure for the jury consideration
of diminished capacity evidence (called abnormal mental condition in this case) by
stating:
Assuming the introduction of evidence showing "abnormal mental condition,"
the judge will consider an appropriate instruction making it clear to the jury that
even though defendant did not have an abnormal mental condition that absolves him of criminal responsibility, e.g., if he had substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to control his behavior he may have had a
condition that negatives the specific mental state required for a higher degree of
crime, e.g., if the abnormal mental condition existing at the time of the homicide
deprived him of the capacity for the premeditation required for first degree
murder.
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on the defense. This procedure is logical since the burden should
be on the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense including
intent.
Two recent Minnesota cases have considered whether diminished responsibility may be asserted as a defense at trial. In State v.
Bouwman 108 the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a certi-

fied question from the trial court essentially asking whether the
issue of specific intent could be tried separately from the issue of
sanity. The defendant apparently intended to argue that he
lacked the capacity to form the requisite specific intent to commit
first degree murder by offering evidence of diminished
responsibility.
The court rejected the defense of diminished responsibility, deciding that intent as a factual issue is different from the issue of
mental capacity of the defendant. At the stage of the trial which
determines intent, the jury alone has the responsibility of determining the existence of specific intent. The defendant may offer
evidence to rebut the "physical facts upon which the inference of
the fact of intent is sought to be established by the prosecution.' 0 9
Psychiatric evidence of the defendant's mental capacity to form
the requisite intent to commit the criminal act was held to be of no
probative value at the intent stage of the trial. Such evidence was
relegated to the capacity, or second stage of trial.
The defense of diminished responsibility was rejected by the
court'

10

citing Bethea v. UnitedStates. I

Interestingly, the court felt

compelled to distinguish the defense of intoxication from the concept of diminished responsibility finding "significant evidentiary
distinctions between 'partial or relative insanity' and conditions
such as intoxication, medication, epilepsy, infancy, or senility."' 12
The court also stated that these latter conditions are "susceptible
to quantification and lay understanding.""13 This language by the
court implies that mental retardation would be accepted as a defense to specific intent based upon the characteristics of retardation rather than being introduced through the concept of
diminished responsibility.
The holding of the court is an obvious attempt to prohibit ex108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1982).
Id at 705.
Id at 706.
365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976).
See State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982).
Id
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pert medical testimony on the issue of intent and confine such expert medical testimony to the capacity stage of trial. The court
apparently does not want the intent stage of trial to become a battleground of medical and psychological experts on the issue of the
defendant's ability to form the requisite intent for the criminal act
4
charged.1 ,

In a companion case, State v. Hofman, "15 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held for the first time that a defendant has a due process
right, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Minnesota State
Constitution, to assert the defense of mental illness.' 6 This right
does not extend, however, to the concept of diminished responsibility at the intent stage of trial.
If the defense elects a unitary rather than a bifurcated trial, the
court set forth a procedure which requires that the jury "first determine if the state has proved all elements of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt before proceeding to the defense of
mental illness."" ' 7 Presumably, this procedure is accomplished by
a preliminary instruction given to the jury prior to the time testimony is received in the case. The procedure also requires that the
state present its evidence on factual and intent issues, then rest
temporarily. The defense then presents its rebuttal evidence on
these issues. Psychological evidence relating to the defendant's capacity is not admissible during the rebuttal. The state then offers
rebuttal evidence on the factual and intent issues and the trial continues until both sides have rested on this portion of the trial.
Only then may evidence be offered of the defendant's mental illness at the unitary trial.1"8

In apparent contradiction to its announced rejection of the diminished responsibility of defense, the court held that although it
was exclusively a jury function to determine the defendant's
mental capacity to formulate the requisite mental intent, it "will
114. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Wahl who forcibly argues that the majority opinion is inconsistent with the general American rule on diminished responsibility.
Id at 707 (Wahl, J., dissenting). Justice Wahl correctly separates the issue of the defendant's ability to form the requisite mental intent to commit the charged criminal offense
from the defense of insanity under MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1982). The majority opinion
neglects or refuses to recognize the importance of this distinction, especially for the mentally retarded offender.
115. See State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. 1982).
116. Id. at 715.
117. Id. at 716.
118. Id at 716-17.
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permit qualified experts to answer this ultimate question so long as
an appropriate instruction is given to the jury emphasizing that it
is their function to make this determination and any opinions on
these questions are not binding upon them."' 9 Arguably, this reasoning opens the door to the diminished responsibility defense in
Minnesota. If the defense may offer evidence on the issue of
whether the defendant had the capacity to form the requisite specific intent for the offense charged, the defense of diminished responsibility has for all purposes been allowed.
In contrast, California has adopted the diminished capacity defense to negate a specific mental state if caused by intoxication,
trauma, or disease, but does not permit the prosecution to present
expert testimony to prove specific intent. 20 Diminished capacity
may be considered to rebut malice aforethought and intent to
kill,12 1 to reduce first degree murder to voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter, 2 2 and in conjunction with an insanity defense. Evidence of insanity is also admissible to prove diminished
23

capacity. 1

The English experience is similar to the American. English law
specifically includes language that recognizes retardation as an ab1 24
normality of the mind which results in diminished capacity.
In most cases criminal culpability is not merely "all or nothing,"
especially where disorders like retardation are involved. As one
commentator states, "Modern psychoanalytic knowledge does not
119. Id. at 717.
120. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 350-51, 202 P.2d 53, 65-66 (1949); Young,
Rethinking the Speific-General Intent Doctrine in Califorima Criminal Law, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
1352, 1364-66 (1975).
121. See People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 732-33, 336 P.2d 492, 502-03 (1959);see also
People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 822-23, 394 P.2d 959, 976-77, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 288-89
(1964).
122. See People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
820 (1966); People v. Mosher, I Cal. 3d 379, 391, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386
(1969); see also Note, Diminished Capacity: Its Potential Effect in Caifornia, 3 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 153 (1970).
123. See People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 327, 583 P.2d 1308, 1314, 149 Cal. Rptr.
265, 271 (1978). But see Act of Sept. 10, 1981, ch. 404, 1981 Cal. Stat. 1591, which purports to abolish diminished capacity as a defense yet allows evidence to show whether the
defendant actually formed intent.
124. See Homicide Act, 1957, 8 Halsbury's Stat., § 2, at 459 (1969) (present version at
11 HALSBURY'S L. ENG. § 1165, at 621 (1976)).

2.

Persons suffering from diminished responsibility
(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not
be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind
or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired
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support the legal fiction of an absolute dichotomous distinction between the responsible and the irresponsible."'' 25 The judiciary, appreciating this flaw in legal insanity tests, has embarked on a quiet
search for a method to permit the trier of fact to understand the
particular mental state of the accused at the time of the commission of the criminal act without necessarily resorting to the "all or
nothing" traditional tests of insanity. This fact is best evidenced
by the decisions in Durham and Brawner, but is also evidenced by
the decisions on diminished capacity in jurisdictions such as
California.
At least for specific intent crimes, 12 6 the diminished capacity
concept may serve to place the full burden of establishing intent as
an element of the offense on the prosecution, and make the duty of
the accused to, rebut clearer. The traditional legal insanity defense
focuses on the mental condition of the accused after an implied or
actual admission of guilt, and ignores his capacity to specifically
intend the commission of the criminal act. Use of diminished capacity may, therefore, be more desirable in any criminal trial
where the intent of the accused is at issue. Specifically, the diminished capacity defense asks the question, "Did the defendant have
the capacity to form the intent necessary to commit the act
charged?"
If the jury answers "yes," the the defendant is guilty and evidence of mental incapacity would be relevant for the sentencing
decision. If the accused did not possess the requisite intent, then
he is not guilty and is subject to hospitalization for treatment until
his disorder is sufficiently treated or controlled to allow his return
to society.
his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to
the killing.
(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the
person charged is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder.
(3) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal
or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted
of manslaughter.
(4) The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable
to be convicted of murder shall not affect the question of whether the killing
amounted to murder in the case of any other party to it.
Following the statute is the "General Note" discussion of diminished capacity, which contains a summary of the defense in England. See also Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 28890.
125. Diamond, CrimuzalResponsibih'yof the Men/ally II, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59, 73 (1961).
Diamond suggests that it is not logical or necessary for the law to have evolved into the
"all or nothing" attitude toward the mens tea of the mentally ill offender. Id at 72.
126. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 67, at 196.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss2/1

28

Skeen: The Genetically Defective Offender
19831

GENETICALL Y DEFECTIVE OFFENDERS

The distinction between specific and general intent, however,
may no longer be important. 27 For example, if the defendant is
charged with an unlawful killing, it would be an easy task to apportion criminal culpability according to his capacity to understand the various degrees of murder. A fully responsible defendant
would be found guilty of first degree murder, where a severely impaired defendant might be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter or even acquitted. The jury as trier of fact could be given
special verdict instructions describing the various forms of murder
and manslaughter, and choose the offense which it believes properly satisfies the degree of the defendant's criminal culpability.1 28
For the genetically defective offender, this type of procedure
may be the only equitable method for his disorder to be fairly
judged. To require the genetically defective offender to be tried
according to the traditional "all or nothing" legal insanity defense
ignores the reality of his disorder and may result in a hopelessly
unfair trial. Different disorders need and require flexible standards to accurately judge their effect on the individual.

IV.

THE GENETIC DEFENSE

A.

Evidentiary Considerations

In order to establish a legitimate defense of legal insanity or diminished capacity, evidence on the effects of the genetic abnormality must be admissible as scientific evidence. The standard for
admissibility of scientific evidence in virtually all jurisdictions is
the Frye test. 1 29 Decided over fifty years ago, the rule announced
by the Frye court provides:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be rcognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
127. See Diamond, supra note 125, at 83, where the author argues that in California the
next step after the Gorshen decision is to expand the principle of limited or diminished
capacity to all definitions of crime.
128. See Dix, PsychologicalAbnormality as a Factor in GradingCrimizal Liabiliy. Dirnbutshed
Capacity, DbninishedResponsibihiy, and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCi.
313, 313-14 (1971), discussing the system of grading criminal offenses based on the degree
of psychological abnormality of the offender.
129. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.' 30
One legal scholar has repudiated the Fye test and suggests that
"any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
exclusion."' 3' This new standard of admissibility is referred to as
the scientific reliability theory. 132 But whether a court uses the
general acceptance or scientific reliability standard, the question
remains, will evidence of a genetic defect and its resulting effects
be admissible as scientific evidence?
The preliminary evidentiary issue to be decided focuses on
whether genetic defects can be linked to disorders that are generally accepted by a speciality within a generalfieldofscience. 133 As I
have suggested, such a disorder may include retardation. Thus,
the preliminary inquiry is whether a field of science generally
agrees that genetic defects can cause retardation.
Genetic research studies provide ample evidence to conclude
that retardation is a condition commonly associated with an extra
"Y" chromosome, and some other genetic variations. 134 There is
not total agreement that retardation and genetic defects are related, but neither the Fe
nor the scientific reliability standards
require absolute acceptance by every researcher in the field. To
require absolute acceptance would exclude all scientific evidence,
for there will always be a dissenting voice.
Given the relation of chromosome defects to retardation and
low intelligence, expert genetic and psychological testimony would
be able to satisfy the Frye test for this condition. The research
studies provide less support for the proposition that the genetic
defect caused by an extra Y or X chromosome results in an aggressive or violent personality, and in fact, may not support that hy130. Id at 1014. See also FED. R. EVID. 104(e), on weight of the evidence proposed. A
lack of consensus in the medical profession regarding the underlying principles of a scientific principle goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.16, at 159 n.54 (2d ed. 1974).
131.

C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§

203,

at 491 (2nd ed. 1972) (referring to Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1969)). Expert
testimony in the federal courts is governed by FED. R. EVID. 702.
132. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 131.
133. FED. R. EVID. 104, sets forth the preliminary issues a judge must consider when
the admissibility of evidence is in dispute. See also A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 5-8 (2d ed. 1978).
134. See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
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pothesis. 135 Other traits of genetically defective males, such as
tallness and acne, are essentially for identification purposes only
and probably do not have direct relevance to criminal culpability.
B.

Review of the Cases

The first reported case where an XYY chromosome defect may
have been at issue in determining the defendant's criminal culpability was not decided on that issue, and evidence of the defendant's genetic defect was not discovered until several years after
trial. It may well have been an important consideration, however,
in deciding the defendant's criminal responsibility.
In Regrna v. Tail, 136 the defendant was charged with the brutal
murder of an old woman. He admitted his responsibility for the
murder, but pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and offered
expert psychiatric testimony to corroborate his plea.137 A psychiatrist testified the defendant was suffering from sexual psychopathy,
a mental disorder or disease based on personality and character
disorders which leads one to behave in a grossly antisocial fashion
in sexual relations.1 38 He further testified that an integral part of
the problem was the need to inflict pain on the victim (sadism) or
upon himself (masochism), and that these disorders were of an explosive nature with the tendency to have outbursts of an extremely
antisocial and perverse sexual nature.139 Interestingly, these symp135. A cautious approach is suggested in arguing that aggression is always found in
genetically abnormal offenders, although there is some evidence for that theory. See
Hamerton, supra note 12; N6el, Duport, Revil, Dussuyer & Quack, The A'FSyndrome." Reality or Myth?, 5 CLINICAL GENETICS 387, 393 (1974). Some studies did not find aggressive
behavior or could not positively link aggression to the genetically abnormal offender. See
Aggressive Behavior, supra note 4; Price, et al., Crminal Patients, supra note 10; Price &
Whatmore, supra note 11; Hook, supra note 36.
136. 1963 Vict. R. 520 (Austl.).
137. Id. at 521.
138. Id. at 525-26.
139. Id. at 526. The defense counsel had asked the psychiatrist several questions, attempting to conform the testimony to the requirements of the M'Naghten test. He asked:
Q. Whatever the reason, whether it is irresistible impulse or anything else
I do not care, do you say that he probably could or could not make a moral
judgment?
A. Well, I think over a short period he probably could not make a moral
judgment-an adequate moral judgment.

Q. When you say he could not make it, you mean he could not make any
such judgment at all or that his moral judgment was influenced by other and
perhaps immoral considerations?
A. Well, I see the difficulty and I have tried to put it the way I look at it.
When a person is acting under a tremendously strong, although very abnormal
force, instinct, urge, impulse, whatever you call it, which is only-of course, it is
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toms parallel the research findings on aggression in genetically defective offenders.
The defendant was convicted. On appeal, the court interpreted
the psychiatric testimony to mean that at some stage during the
attack on the victim Tait was so overcome by sexual fury that he
was unable in any proper legal sense to appreciate that his actions
were morally or legally wrong. Further, the court held that Tait's
conduct arose from a mental disease or disorder which made him
legally not responsible for his acts due to insanity." 40 The appellate court weighed this testimony against the prosecution's expert
psychiatric testimony that Tait remained capable of knowing the
nature and quality of his acts, and that he knew he was doing
14 1
wrong in murdering the victim.

Several appeals followed, 42 but each decision affirmed the
death sentence. Only by action of the executive branch, which
was apparently convinced that the defendant was mentally ill or
intellectually defective, was the death sentence commuted to life
imprisonment. 143 Five years after his conviction, Tait was identified as an XYY individual during a chromosome study at the institution in which he was being held. 44 His abnormal genetic
composition, however, had not been an issue at his trial or on
appeal.
The first case in which the XYY chromosome defect was an issue involved the trial of Daniel Hugon. 14 5 Hugon had fled Paris
after murdering a prostitute, but returned and voluntarily surrendered to police and confessed to the crime. While awaiting trial in
at a conscious level, he certainly knew what he was doing-but the motivations,
the mechanism behind this impulse, he certainly would not understand and they
would be, to a considerable extent, subconscious or unconscious in his mind, but
whatever it is, whatever combination of degrees of conscious appreciation and
subconscious factors, at the time that a person of this kind is gripped by-I think
I used the words "sexual fury"-I do not think that is an exaggeration-the
mind is so-their whole being, their whole action is so intent on carrying out this
act that any appreciation-any moral factors involved, are in abeyance at that
time. That is my belief of the way this sort of human mind works on this sort of
occasion.
Id at 527.
140. Id at 527.
141. Id
142. Re Tait, 1963 Vict. R. 532 (Austl.); Tait v. Regina, 1963 Vict. 547 (Austl.); see
also note at 1963 Vict. R. 564 (Austl.); Tait v. The Queen, 36 Austl. L.J.R. 330 (1963).
143. Tait v. The Queen, 108 C.L.R. 620, 625 (1962).
144. Fox, The XYY Offender: A Modem Myth, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 59 (1971).
145. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
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jail, he unsuccessfully attempted suicide. The court immediately
ordered a series of extensive mental and physical examinations,
most of which would not otherwise have been undertaken. A karyotype analysis of Hugon's chromosomes was made and an extra Y
chromosome was discovered. The court then named a committee
composed of a psychiatrist, a geneticist, and a professor of
medicine to advise on how best to handle the discovery and any
implications the extra chromosome may have regarding the re46
sponsibility of the defendant for his actions. 1
The chairman of the committee reported those born with chromosome abnormalities have a 30% greater chance of becoming
criminals than others in the general population. He further stated
that everything in the defendant's life history indicated a "sick
man" from birth, and that his hereditary affliction prevented him
47
from exercising normal responsibility. 1
Hugon was convicted, but received a sentence of only seven
years apparently due to the extenuating circumstances created by
148
his abnormal chromosome defect.

The 1968 Australian case of Regzna v. Hannel1149 involved a
known XYY offender and the genetic defect defense. Hannell's
chromosome defect was discovered prior to trial and the evidence
regarding this abnormality was an issue at trial. The defendant
was accused of murdering his landlady, and had confessed to his
acts after a short period of flight to avoid arrest.' 5 0 Upon examination, it was apparent Hannell was intellectually very dull, had a
very low IQ and possessed an XYY chromosome constitution.' 15
Initially the defendant was found unfit to stand trial based on
psychiatric testimony that he was mentally defective due to his low
IQ. Hannell was subsequently placed on trial, however, after both
the prosecution and defense satisfied the trial judge of his mental
fitness. 152 The defense of insanity was raised and considerable psy146. Id
147. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1968, at 5, col. 4.
148. Id.
149. An English XYY Murder Trial, I BRIT. MED. J. 201 (1969); see Bartholomew &
Sutherland, A Defence of lnsani'ty and the Extra Y Chromosome: R. v. Hannell, 1 AUSTL. & N.Z.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 29 (1968).
150. Bartholomew & Sutherland, supra note 149, at 30.
151. See id. at 31. The defendant had a Verbal IQ of 65, Performance IQ of 83, Full
Scale IQ of 71. The Full Scale score and quality of test responses was consistent overall
with borderline defective intelligence.
152. See id. at 33. Initially, the Crown's counsel had asserted defendant's unfitness to
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chiatric evidence was presented.153 During the trial, the defendant
was re-examined and found unfit to continue. The case was then
submitted to the jury upon the evidence heard to that point, and
they were instructed on the insanity issue according to the
M I'aghlen rule. 154 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, and the defendant was ordered held indefinitely
due to his condition. 155 To date, this is the only case resulting in a
not guilty verdict where evidence of an XYY genetic defect has
been raised.
In West Germany the same year, 1968, Ernest Dieter Beck was
56
sentenced to life imprisonment for the murders of three women. 1
At trial, scientists informed the court that Beck had an extra Y
chromosome and this made him unable to control his impulses to
commit crimes ranging from house-breaking to murder. 157 The
court, nevertheless, accepted the prosecution's argument that Beck
was fully aware he was committing the murders even though he
might not have been able to control his impulse to kill. 15 8 There is
no capital punishment in West Germany. Thus, the fact Beck was
given the maximum sentence leaves us to question the impression
made by this defense. 159
The following year, John Farley was accused of a brutal rape
and murder in New York. 160 No attempt was made to deny the
defendant committed the murder. The defense concentrated instead on rebutting the presumption of sanity using an XYY genetic defense. 161
plead and stand trial, and the defense counsel did not contest this position. No explanation is given for the change in position by either counsel.
153. See id. at 33-34.
154. See id at 34-35.
155. Abnormal Chromosome, 4 BRIT. MED. J. 398 (1968).
156. See Fox, supra note 144, at 60.
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id
160. Note, The XYY Syndrome, 16 N.Y.L.F. 232, 246 n.78 (1970). The evidence against
the defendant was strong. His fingerprints were found on the victim's eyeglasses, stairway,
and on two lights in the alley where the murder took place. Id at 246 n.79.
161. Id. at 246. The defendant exhibited common traits of an XYY male, as he was
unusually tall and had previously exhibited aggressive and antisocial behavior. The defense relied upon N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1983), which provides:
1. A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to
know or appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequence of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong.
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Two expert witnesses testified for the defense, a cytogeneticist
and a psychiatrist. The cytogeneticist testified as a teaching witness to inform the court and jury on the effects of an extra Y chromosome, and to explain the current research in this field.' 62 He
testified that in his opinion, there was a connection between the
defendant's antisocial behavior and his chromosome abnormality. 16 3 He also testified that the chromosome defect had a causory
effect on the defendant's behavior pattern, stating that when an
XYY male is intoxicated he can become very aggressive and mean,
and can start fighting.164 The psychiatrist described the defendant's emotional composition as schizophrenic with periods of psychosis, 165 but testified he did not know whether the extra Y
66
chromosome had any significance in the defendant's behavior.1
This testimony was criticized by the trial judge because no attempt was made by the witness to relate the defendant's emotional
16 7
condition to his chromosome defect.
The prosecution's psychiatric expert indicated that the defendant was not suffering from a mental defect which would render
him criminally irresponsible, and further, the mere presence of an
extra Y chromosome did not predispose an individual to criminality. 168 Using the M'Naghten test, the jury found the defendant
guilty. He was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. 69
Again the genetic abnormality seemed to have little or no effect on
the sentencing decision of the judge.
In People v. Tanner, 170 the defendant was originally charged with
kidnapping, forcible rape, and assault with intent to commit mur2. In any prosecution for an offense, lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect, as defined in subdivision one of this section, is a
defense.
Id
162. Note, supra note 160, at 246.
163. Farrell, The XYY Syndrome zn CritninalLaw. An Introduction, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. RE.
217, 218 (1969).
164. Note, supra note 160, at 246 n.80.
165. Id at 247. See also DSM-III, supra note 22, at 181 for the classification of schizophrenic disorders.
166. Farrell,supra note 163, at 218.
167. Id. at 218. But Judge Farrell, who was the trial judge, also states affirmatively,
"Its [XYY] relevancy as part of an insanity defense should not be opened to serious dispute." Id A properly prepared psychiatrist would have impressed the judge and may
have helped obtain a favorable verdict or a more lenient sentence.
168. Note, supra note 160, at 247.
169. Id; see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1969, at 93, col. 4.
170. 13 Cal. App. 3d 596, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1970); see also Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1408
(1972).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 1
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

der. After he plead guilty to the assault charge, the other charges
were dismissed. Prior to sentencing, the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Tanner to determine whether he might be a
mentally disordered sex offender. Their report recommended further study and observation at a state hospital. 17 ' During the next
six months, Tanner was found to be a mentally disordered sex offender. The doctors at the state hospital determined further treatment or hospitalization would be useless since Tanner resisted
treatment.

7 2

During this confinement at the state hospital Tanner was discovered to possess an extra Y chromosome. Since he had already
pleaded guilty and had been sent to the hospital for evaluation,
the defendant moved the court to withdraw his plea and substitute
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court ordered an
evidentiary hearing to consider the feasibility of an insanity plea
73
based on an abnormal chromosome constitution.
The defense introduced two expert witnesses, both geneticists,
who testified the defendant was in fact an XYY individual and
comprehensively explained the procedures in identifying such individuals. 174 Both doctors told about recent research conducted in
this field by themselves and other scientists, the results of which
were reported in medical periodicals. They stated that these studies suggested XYY individuals exhibit aggressive behavior as a
175
causal result of the chromosomal defect.
The court found that on the primary issue of the behavioral effects of the XYY syndrome, both defense experts had merely suggested aggressive behavior may be one manifestation of the
syndrome and evidence produced by the cited studies did not suggest all XYY individuals were involuntarily aggressive.' 76 Deciding that the testimony was inconclusive since so few studies of the
XYY syndrome had been undertaken, the Tanner court concluded
171. People v. Tanner, 13 Cal. App. 3d 596, 598, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 657 (1970).
172. Id. The CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6300 (West 1980) (repealed 1981) provided:
As used in this article, "mentally disordered sex offender" means any person
who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and
safety of others. Wherever the term "sexual psychopath" is used in any code,
such term shall be construed to refer to and mean a "mentally disordered sex
offender."
Id.
173.
174.
175.
176.

People v. Tanner, 13 Cal. App. 2d 596, 598, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 657 (1970).
Id at 600, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59.
Id
Id at 600-01, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
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the experts could not determine whether Tanner's aggressive behavior resulted from his extra Y chromosome. 177 The court specifically noted neither expert had testified that possession of an extra
Y chromosome results in a mental disease which constitutes legal
insanity under the California version of M'Naghten. 178 Therefore,
79
the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was denied.
In Milard v. State, 180 the defendant was charged with robbery
with a deadly weapon. He pled not guilty by reason of insanity,
arguing that an extra Y chromosome in his brain and other cells of
his body constituted a mental defect, which resulted in his substantial lack of capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.',,
Maryland procedure required the defendant to establish insanity
to the satisfaction of the court by sufficient competent proof before
the issue could be presented to the jury as a defense. 8 2 To meet
this burden of proof, the defense called two witnesses.
A lieutenant from the county jail testified that while in confinement Millard was agitated, nervous, and upset and became so violent on occasions that he had to be handcuffed and shackled in leg
irons. Additionally, Millard cut himself five or six times on his
arm which resulted in severe bleeding. The lieutenant further testified that as a result of Millard's condition, he was sent to three
83
different hospitals for treatment and evaluation.
The second defense witness, Dr. Jacobson, was a medical doctor
and an expert in genetics. He testified that although he received
formal training in psychiatry as a medical student, he was not a
177. Id. The court upheld the trial court's finding that the evidence produced by the
defense experts was not clear and convincing, analogizing the situation to other types of
inadmissible evidence such as voiceprints, Kell-Cellano blood grouping tests, hypnosis,
truth serums, and the polygraph.
178. Id at 601, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
179. Id at 602, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
180. 8 Md. App. 419, 261 A.2d 227 (1970).
181. Id at 228. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 59, § 25 (1967), provided:
(a) A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct and shall be found
insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime if, at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disorder, he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. As used in this section, the terms "mental disorder" do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct.
182. See Riggleman v. State, 33 Md. App. 344, 364 A.2d 1159 (1976); Mahoney v.
State, 8 Md. App. 44, 257 A.2d 462 (1969); Saul v. State, 6 Md. App. 540, 252 A.2d 282
(1968); McCracken v. State, 2 Md. App. 716, 237 A.2d 87 (1967).
183. Millard v. State, 8 Md. App. 419, 421, 261 A.2d 227, 228 (1970).
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psychiatrist and had no competence in the field of psychiatry beyond that possessed by the ordinary medical doctor.' 84 This lack
of specialized training in psychiatry ultimately adversely affected
his credibility and the genetic defect defense presented in the case.
Dr. Jacobson testified that he had examined the defendant and
found cells containing extra Y chromosomes. He stated that the
presence of the extra chromosome constituted a basic defect in the
genetic complement of the cells, which affected both the cells'
growth and the body's growth. 8 5 He further testified that the extra Y chromosome caused marked physical and mental problems
affecting the manner persons possessing this disorder react to certain stimuli.'8

6

Dr. Jacobson concluded that "if the definition of

insanity has a mental defect, the answer is yes, he [Millard] has a
187
mental defect based upon his abnormal [chromosome] test."'
When asked if the defect could cause the defendant to lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, he answered, "I cannot say that because I have not examined him as a
psychiatrist. I have no competence in that area."' 8 8 He did state
that based upon the defendant's conduct, behavior, andgenetic defect, he was insane and not competent to stand trial.t89
At the conclusion of the defense testimony, the trial judge believed the defense had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of sanity and the issue could go to the jury. 90 The
prosecution argued the court should withhold its ruling until testimony of the state's expert witness had been heard. The state psychiatrist then testified that after an extensive psychiatric
examination, he concluded Millard was not insane. He diagnosed
the defendant's condition as an antisocial personality, with schizoid trends indicating the likelihood of psychotic episodes in the
future. 9 '
184. Id. at 422, 261 A.2d at 228-29.
185. Id. at 423, 261 A.2d at 229.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 423-24, 261 A.2d at 229.
188. Id at 424, 261 A.2d at 229.
189. Id at 425, 261 A.2d at 230. The definition of insanity used by Dr. Jacobsen was
not a legal definition, but a medical diagnosis of the defendant's condition arrived at after
considering the genetic defect studies and the defendant's history.
190. Id
191. Id. The prosecution's psychiatrist did not examine the defendant pertaining to a
genetic defect since he did not believe an extra Y chromosome was a "mental defect"
according to § 9(a), but rather was a physical defect not affecting the mental functioning

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss2/1

38

Skeen: The Genetically Defective Offender
1983]

GENETICALLY DEFECTIVE OFFENDERS

At the conclusion of the state's testimony, the trial judge reversed his previous position and declined to submit the issue of
Millard's sanity to the jury. He stated that Dr. Jacobson's testimony regarding the defendant's mental condition was not competent under Maryland law because it was not based on a reasonable
medical certainty. 9 2 The appellate court also faulted Dr. Jacobson's testimony for failing to relate the effect of an XYY disorder
to the requirements of Maryland law; Even though Dr. Jacobson
believed Millard was insane and incompetent to stand trial, this
belief was based on a definition of insanity different from the one
prescribed by state law. 193 There was concern by the court that
Dr. Jacobson's definition of insanity was so general it would include a person who would attempt suicide. This conception of the
law was incorrect.
In reviewing the evidence presented on the XYY syndrome at
trial, the court stated:
[W]e do not intend to hold, as a matter of law, that a defense of
insanity based upon the so- called XYY genetic defect is beyond the pale of proof under section 9(a). We only conclude
that on the record before us the trial judge properly declined to
permit the case to go to the jury

....

194

This statement is encouraging for the future assertion of this defense, because apparently if the defense had presented adequate
testimony by a psychiatrist to corroborate Dr. Jacobson's testimony, the insanity issue would have gone to the jury.
In a New York case, People v. Yukl, 195 Charles Yukl was charged
with the murder of a young woman in his apartment. 196 He had
been previously convicted of a similar brutal killing and had been
recently released from prison.' 9 7 After conviction, the defendant
appealed the denial of his request for the appointment of a
cytogeneticist to perform a chromosome test which would have
of the brain. This position has been refuted by several studies cited previously in this
paper. See, e.g., DSM-III, supra note 22, at 181.
192. Id at 426, 261 A.2d at 230. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to
eighteen years in prison.
193. Id at 426, 261 A.2d at 231.
194. Id. at 428, 261 A.2d at 231-32.
195. 83 Misc. 2d 364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1975).
196. Id The evidence indicated the victim was found murdered on the roof of the
apartment building where the defendant resided. The defendant's culpability for the
crime was not in issue, only his insanity based on a genetic defect.
197. Id at 365, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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been offered at trial.19 8

The court began its analysis by asking the necessary preliminary
question of whether this type of evidence qualified for admission as
scientific evidence. Noting a reluctance by other courts to admit
evidence of genetic defects because of the inconclusive research
studies on the XYY issue and a failure to meet reasonable medical
certainty standards, the court affirmed the trial court's denial. 99
It did set forth, however, a rule for the future introduction of such
evidence:
Thus, in New York an insanity defense based on chromosome abnormality should be possible only if one establishes
with a high degree of medical certainty an etiological relationship between the defendant's mental capacity and the genetic syn-

drome. Further, the genetic imbalance must have so affected
the thought processes as to interfere substantially with the deunderstand or
fendant's cognitive capacity or with his ability to
2°
appreciate the basic moral code of his society.

0

Using this standard, the mentally retarded offender suffering from
the effects of a genetic defect could have a reasonable chance in
New York of establishing the insanity defense based on an XYY
chromosome constitution. The rule pronounced by the court
merely requires the establishment of a causal link between the defendant's condition and the genetic defect. The defendant is not
required to establish a general rule that all or most individuals
with genetic defects are retarded.
Another interesting aspect of the Yukl rule is its departure or
modification of the generally accepted Fye test. 20 1 The New York
court suggests a specific standard for the admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence. This suggestion resembles that in
Coppohno v. State, 202 a Florida case wherein the court admitted evidence of a new scientific test based on a reasonable medical cer198. Id. at 368-72, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 317-20. The defendant also appealed from a denial
of his request for a bifurcated trial. Id. at 365-68, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 315-17.
199. Id. at 372, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
200. Id. at 370, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 319 (emphasis added).
201. But see Survey of New York Law---Part One. Public Law (Criminal Procedure), 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 13, 28 (1977), which states that the Yuk/ court adopted the Fye test by
denying the motion for a cytogeneticist. But the mere denial of the motion is not in itself
an adoption of Fre. Clearly, the rule adopted by the court is less strict than the general
acceptance standard in Fye.
202. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1968). An expert witness had performed a generally unknown
test for the detection of the poison, succinyleholine chloride, in a human cadaver. Id. at
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tainty. The test was generally believed to be impossible prior to
trial and did not enjoy general acceptance in the scientific
community.
In State v. Roberts, 203 the defendant was charged and convicted of
grand larceny of an automobile. 20 4 On appeal, the defendant alleged the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance for him
to have an additional psychiatric examination to determine
20 5
whether he was an XYY individual was an abuse of discretion.
The Washington Court of Appeals found that "the behavioral
impact of this chromosome defect had not been precisely determined

' 20 6

and that "presently available medical evidence is un-

able to establish a reasonably certain causal connection between
the XYY defect and criminal conduct. '20 7 The court denied reversal on this issue because in its opinion the studies on genetic
20 8
defects did not support a genetic defect defense.
What the court failed to recognize was that a specific link to
criminal conduct is not necessary, but merely a connection to a
condition which affects the capacity of the accused to form the
mental capacity for the specific criminal act charged. Otherwise,
the inquiry focuses on the "criminal gene" theory which is an incorrect characterization of a genetic abnormality.
With one exception, the genetic defense has not absolved a defendant of criminal culpability under the traditional tests of insanity. In some cases, the research studies may have been
sufficient to convince the trier of fact of the defendant's insanity
but the expert witnesses were unprepared or did not possess the
necessary expertise to render reliable opinions. But none of these
cases was tried with the research information now available. Several courts have pronounced encouraging standards of admissibility for genetic defect evidence, and with the use of the research
studies discussed in section II of this Article, a proper case may be
made in these jurisdictions.
C

Proceduraland Ethical Considerations

An insanity defense based on a genetic defect poses two impor203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

14 Wash. App. 727, 544 P.2d 754 (1976).
Id. at 727, 544 P.2d at 755.
Id. at 733, 544 P.2d at 758.
Id.
Id. at 733-34, 544 P.2d at 758.
Id. at 734, 544 P.2d at 759.
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tant issues for the defense counsel: trial strategy and ethical considerations. 20 9 Trial strategy is a most difficult issue because the
decision to assert an insanity defense alone is a virtual concession
of the defendant's responsibility for the criminal act. Should there
be a doubt in the jury's mind about the defendant's insanity, it
could vote for conviction and the court could impose a long prison
sentence. Even when the defense is successful, the defendant may
face an indefinite term of detention in a state hospital until certified sane.
The decision to assert the insanity defense is especially difficult
in cases where the criminal act is relatively minor and the maximum sentence is short. Although it is tempting to simply ignore
the sanity issue, for defense counsel representing a client with a
potential insanity defense to take no action raises equally difficult
ethical and professional considerations which have a direct influence on trial strategy.
The proposed Rules of Professional Conduct

210

provide some

guidance in resolving these ethical considerations. Generally a
lawyer is expected to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client,2 11 and to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the case while explaining the legal
21 2
and practical aspects and alternative courses of action available.
These general responsibilities may have to be qualified when the
client is insane or lacks the ability to comprehend the nature of the
proceedings.
The Rules provide:
When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired,
whether because of minority, mental dzsabzh/t

or some other rea-

son, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
21 3
normal client-lawyer rleationship with the client.
For the defense counsel representing a client suffering from the
effects of a genetic abnormality, this rule provides the foundation
for properly representing the client. If the client is able to assist in
making tactical decisions regarding the conduct of the defense, al209. See generally Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense.- The PracticalSide, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 533 (1972).
210. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft 1982) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL RULES].

211. Id. at § 1.3.
212. Id. at § 1.4(a) & (b).
213. Id at § 1.14(a) (emphasis added) and Notes: Code Comparisons.
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though impaired to some degree, the lawyer must abide by the
client's decisions. 2 14 The lawyer must give an honest opinion to
the client about the consequences likely to result from a decision, 21 5 but may not assist the client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. 2 16 If a genetically defective client desires not to raise an
insanity or diminished capacity defense, then the decision by the
client is binding on the defense lawyer.217
An important corollary consideration is the duty of a defense
counsel to advise the trial judge of a potential insanity defense
which the defendant refuses to assert.2 18 Is the failure to take such
action by the defense counsel misleading or fraudulent? The answer is that the defense counsel has a duty to provide the client
with effective representation of counsel and there would be no
duty to advise the court during the trial. If the client is convicted,
then at sentencing the lawyer would have a duty to inform the
court of the defendant's condition and present a sentencing plan
which stresses treatment. Using this format, the court is not misled
regarding the defendant's condition when making the sentencing
decision and the lawyer fulfills his obligation to the client. Nonetheless, the court may consider asserting the insanity defense independently and in opposition to the defendant's desires. 2 ' 9 But, for
the defense counsel to properly fulfill his obligation to the client,
the procedure outlined above should be followed. It is not possible
to fulfill obligations to the client and court simultaneously on this
issue. Should the court believe the defendant is mentally incapacitated, procedural rules in most jurisdictions provide for a mental
examination on the prosecution's or court's own motion2 20 and the
expert medical witness appointed by the court would testify as a
22
court's witness rather than for one of the parties. '
For defense counsel, the more difficult case arises when the cli214. Id at § 1.2(a) and Comment: Scope of Representation.
215. Id at § 2.1.
216. See id at § 3.3(a)(1) & (2).
217. Id at § 1.2(a).
218. Id at § 3.3(a). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1982), where if the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons certifies to the Attorney General that a person convicted of an offense
against the United States may have been mentally incompetent at the trial and his incompetency was not raised at trial, and if after a hearing the person is found to have been
incompetent at trial, his conviction shall be vacated and he shall be granted a new trial.
219. See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Note,
supra note 84. It may also be necessary for defense counsel to seek appointment of a
guardian. MODEL RULES, supra note 210, § 1.14(a) & (b); MINN. STAT. § 525.54 (1982).
220. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1982).
221. Id The medical expert would be used only to determine if the defendant could
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ent is so mentally impaired or retarded that the lawyer must accept full responsibility for the decision to assert or reject a genetic
insanity defense. Certainly a lawyer must not raise a defense
which is not meritorious. 22 For the genetically defective offender
suffering from retardation or unable to control his aggressive impulses, however, such a defense may be meritorious.
When a lawyer cannot communicate with his client, the Model
Rules provide for the lawyer to seek the appointment of a guardian to make decisions for the defendant. 223 In such cases, the lawyer should advise the guardian in the same manner he would
advise the client and would be bound by the decision of the guardian. If no guardian is appointed, the lawyer must act to safeguard
and advance the interests of the client. 224 This duty would minimally require a psychiatric and cytogenetic examination to determine the validity of the client's genetic insanity defense. 225 To do
2 26
otherwise would be ineffective assistance of counsel.
Once a legitimate genetic insanity defense is established, the
lawyer must consider the effect upon the client of asserting it. The
most logical approach is to weigh the probable criminal sentence
against the effect and length of any civil commitment order resulting from a successful defense, and select not only the shortest period of potential incarceration but also a course of action which
provides the client with any necessary medical treatment.
Should the lawyer be successful in asserting genetic insanity defense in a misdemeanor or minor felony case, the client will be
forever "labeled" as mentally ill and possibly serve an indefinite
period of confinement in a state mental hospital under civil commitment statutes rather than a short sentence in a jail.2 27 For felony cases with the potential of long prison sentences, the genetic
insanity defense should always be considered when meritorious if
only to educate the judge to the defendant's condition in anticipation of receiving a shorter sentence to a penal treatment facility.
CAVEAT: A defense attorney should be especially aware that a
understand the charges or assist in his own defense, and the medical findings would not be
admitted in evidence on the issue of guilt.
222. MODEL RULES, supra note 210, § 3.1.
223. Id at § 1.14(a) & (b) and Comment.
224. Id at § 1.14(a) & (b) and Notes: Code Comparison.
225. See United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1974).
226. Id at 1163-64.
227. For Minnesota commitment procedures, see MINN. STAT. chs. 253A, 253B, &
appendix (1982).
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successful insanity defense may result in the defendant's suffering
significant penalties. For example, in California a defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity and whose sanity has not
been established as restored at the time of the verdict, shall be
confined in a state hospital or other appropriate public or private
treatment facility until certified as sane. 228 The maximum term of
confinement shall be the longest term of imprisonment which
could have been imposed for the offense committed. 229 For certain
offenses such as murder, a person may be committed longer than the
possible maximum sentence by a procedure allowing for continued
commitment in two-year intervals. 230 Every defense counsel must
become acquainted with the rules and decisions in his or her jurisdiction regarding this issue.231

D.

Disposition of Genetic Offnders

The tactical and ethical considerations in the defense of a genetically abnormal offender are closely related to those in the disposi232
tion of such individuals, whether the defense is successful or not.
The sentencing judge encounters a unique situation when confronted with such offenders. 233 If traditional methods of treatment
are inadequate, new methods must be explored to properly sentence and assist these offenders. Because it may be impossible to
correct the genetic defect and its symptoms, the sentencing judge
must marshal all available resources to ensure the offender will
234
benefit from the sentencing conditions.

Mentally disabled persons have a right to treatment under federal law. 235 Important among federal statutes is the DevelopmenCAL. PENAL CODE, § 1026(a) (1982).
Id at § 1026.5(a)(1).
Id. at § 1026.5(b)(1).
For the Minnesota rule, see MINN. STAT. § 253B.12(a) (1982).
See Fox,supra note 144, at 73.
Note, Criminal Law: The XYY Chromosome Complement and Criminal Conduct, 22
OKLA. L. REV. 287, 301 (1969). But see Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 292, who argues
that the XYY offender should not receive any special consideration during sentencing,
and that no person who provides evidence for the sentencing or parole decisions should
comment on the offender's genetic defect.
234. Note, supra note 74, at 916, advocating that XYY offenders should never be incarcerated in penal institutions because rehabilitation of an XYY offender is not possible.
Accord, Note, supra note 160, at 262.
235. See generally R. MACKLIN & W. GAYLIN, MENTAL RETARDATION AND STERILIZA-

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

TION (1981); PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: CENTURY OF DECISION

(1976).
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tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,' 36 which provides
assistance for individuals with developmental disabilities attributable to a mental or physical impairment or both.23? Congress has
also made findings respecting the rights of developmentally disabled persons, providing for "treatment, services, and habilitation
for such disabilities.

'238

States may receive funding to provide these services, 239 on the
condition that they place in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of developmentally disabled persons. 240 Whether
private actions by mentally retarded individuals to enforce the
provisions of the law guaranteeing treatment and habilitation are
24 1
recognized by federal courts is unclear.
Certainly a sentencing judge has sufficient authority to adopt a
meaningful program for the treatment and rehabilitation of a genetically abnormal offender suffering from the effects of retardation.2

42

But the real issue focuses on what particular treatment is

required and under what conditions should the treatment be
administered?
From the very nature of their uncorrectable abnormality, genetically abnormal offenders, as well as all mentally disturbed offenders, need professional treatment before they can effectively
participate in society. Although the current trend is for the treatment in the "least restrictive environment," 24 3 realistically a judge
may be hesitant to risk the safety of citizens (or voter displeasure)
in his community by allowing a genetically abnormal felon to return to the community without severe restrictions. Probation,
without a period of evaluation and treatment in a medical facility
to ensure the safety of the community, may be impractical.
The retarded offender requires assistance to learn the necessary
skills for independent functioning or he will resort to further criminal behavior for support. The genetically abnormal offender
should be evaluated for placement in a drug treatment program at
236. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976).
237. Id. at § 6000.
238. Id at § 6010(1).
239. Id at § 6000(b)(2)(C).
240. Id.at § 6012.
241. See generally Comment, UnitedStates-MentalHealth-The "Bill of Rights" of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Did Not Create Substantive Rights for the
Mentally Retarded to Appropriate Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment, 58 N.D. L. REv.
119 (1982).
242. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.135, & ch. 244, Appendix 11(D) (1982).
243. Comment, supra note 241, at 129, 130-31.
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a medical facility and receive intensive psychiatric and psychological counseling as a first step toward eventual return to society.
One study has reported some success using a treatment of drugs
and counseling with XYY males. 244 Nine of the thirteen XYY

males treated in this program were leading more socially acceptable lifestyles one year after completing the structured treatment
245
program.
In cases where the genetically abnormal offender is found not
guilty by reason of insanity and faces civil commitment, 246 the defense attorney has a responsibility to present a treatment plan that
emphasizes the acquisition of skills that will enable the offender to
function independently in society. The plan must stress the elements stated above for individuals convicted, but must additionally stress independence as the ultimate goal.
Following the trend of the "least restrictive setting" for rehabilitation, community-based outpatient treatment homes would serve
to guide the retarded individual to self-independence. 247 After an

initial period of evaluation and treatment at a secure facility, the
individual could be placed in one of the community-based homes.
This home would serve as a base for the individual's continued
treatment until independence could be achieved, since confinement or restriction to any structured facility should only be considered as temporary placement. Payment for the cost of this
placement should come from state and federal sources designed to
assist developmentally disabled persons through rehabilitation
248
services.
V.

CONCLUSION

The history of the genetic defense is really a saga of overly enthusiastic defense attorneys who prematurely attempted to apply
modern medical research, without fully comprehending the findings or adequately applying the research to their cases.
244. Wiedeking, Money & Walker, Follow-up of/

XYY Males with Impulsive and/or Sex-

Offnding Behavior, 9 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 287 (1979).

245. Id at 291-92.
246. See generally G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 61-74; Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, supra note 74, at 917-21. But see
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4248 (1982), which make no mention of a federal civil
commitment procedure after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity and leaves any
such commitment to the appropriate state authority. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1982) for
the post-sentence commitment procedure.
247. Comment, supra note 241, at 121 n.10.
248. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
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Medical science has provided the foundation for the identification, psychiatric classification, and treatment of individuals with
XYY, XXY, and XXYY chromosome abnormalities. There appears to be a consensus among professionals in the field that retardation is a symptom of genetic abnormality. The assertion that
aggression is also such a symptom does not yet have such acceptance. It should be emphasized that retardation based on a chromosome defect exists in very few individuals and would apply in
only a small number of criminal cases. For those individuals, however, the research findings are significant and offer the promise of
understanding and treatment rather than incarceration and
punishment.
In addition to the advances made in medical research there
have also been advances in judicial attitude toward the acceptance
of this theory. Despite sometimes poorly prepared and presented
genetic defenses, trial courts have seriously considered admitting
the scientific data and expert testimony offered in support of the
defense. And even after rejecting the genetic defense, several appellate courts have pronounced standards for the admissibility of
such evidence in the future which promise the eventual acceptance
of the defense. Both trial and appellate courts seem willing to allow evidence of a genetic defense using traditional insanity tests.
The adventuresome advocate may also consider asserting a diminished capacity defense based on a genetic abnormality even if
no precedent exists in the jurisdiction. For those few offenders
with genetic abnormalities, a jury instruction on diminished capacity may be the most logical, effective, and credible method of
asserting a defense to criminal acts.
Moreover, future trial strategy may well focus on rebutting the
defendant's ability to form the required mental intent to commit
the criminal act charged using the genetic abnormality and its resulting conditions as a foundation for the attack. Using research
data indicating that genetically abnormal offenders have below
average intelligence or are retarded, and relating these studies to
the defendant's condition, a successful attack on the issues of specific intent is possible. Although there is no logical reason why
such strategy could not be applied to general intent crimes, as a
practical matter the value of a successful defense for minor offenses
may be outweighed by the consequences of possible long-term civil
commitment.
The future of the genetic defense is. not hopeless, but rather

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss2/1

48

1983]

Skeen: The Genetically
DefectiveOFFENDERS
Offender
GENETICALL
Y DEFECTIVE

265

seems to suffer from a lack of courage by defense attorneys to forge
ahead after a period of limited and largely unsuccessful application. Given the recent assault on insanity defenses by state legislatures,249 new approaches for asserting a defendant's mental
condition are necessary for the trier of fact to arrive at decisions
about the defendant's mental condition. The genetic defense provides some hope of accomplishing that objective.
249. Clanon, Shawver & Kurdip, Less Sanity in the Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 824 (1982).
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